There are many myths and legends about Russian voting in all Moldovan elections. Some of them are confirmed, but most of them are not. So, my 10 theses about Russian voting in Moldovan elections on 11.07.2021.
- What if I say that PP DA Vasile Kostiuc took 4th place in Russia? Being an aggressive populist in Moldovan elections always works. I suspect, though, that a slogan like “Russia without pigs” can get you in jail there, but here, it’s even okay.
- But those funny guys who proposed to hold a referendum about joining Russia somehow did not take off in Russia itself – about a dozen votes out of almost 6 thousand.
- The only foreign region where Usatii took a stable third place, and in all precincts, and not even a very large loss of votes compared to the presidential election. Better than in Balti, according to the proportions of losses.
- PAS also won second place everywhere but lost in one precinct in Moscow only by a few votes to the Bloc. The thesis of the “geopolitical voting” is again a broken-down wagon, which is going in a different direction and a little bit on the legs of its creators.
- No, the Russian polling stations are no longer the “electoral fortress” of socialists, even with the strengthening of PCRM, which joined them. The total is about 45% of those who voted. In the Donduseni district, for example, the result will be much better. Or in Briceni. Or in Ocnita.
- The result of Kalinin’s “Regions” is probably an echo of its image as a site of some commissions on the national policy and others, and at the same time, they vote for it only in Moscow.
- Shore’s result once again shows that this is all purely an internal story, with a few votes per precinct outside the country and suddenly very many in Kaluga.
- People vote for the Civil Congress in St. Petersburg and in the center of Moscow, almost never in the regions of the Russian Federation. Intellectuals.
- PACE with its “scrapbook” program (return of all Soviet savings) bypasses Moscow and St. Petersburg but takes all its interest in Tula, Kaluga, and the Moscow suburbs. See above about being a populist, this time a financial one.
- The CEC was also missing one protocol in the public access – 38/26, Moscow region. But the main trends can be stated on the available material.
That’s all for now, I’ll repeat as a result the assessment that I voiced more than once or twice before – enough of this whining about “geopolitical vectors”, all sorts of Hartlands and other odious Huntington (who rewrote his theory 3 times, and it still hasn’t worked). It’s enough to look at the numbers. And it is also good to look at the people – a lot of new things will open up.